管理者认知偏差、公司治理质量和过度投资——基于高持续性财务业绩的证据

›› 2016 ›› Issue (02): 26-36.

管理者认知偏差、公司治理质量和过度投资——基于高持续性财务业绩的证据

钟马, 徐光华

南京理工大学经济管理学院, 江苏南京 210094

收稿日期:2015-10-14 出版日期:2016-03-15 发布日期:2016-03-15
作者简介:钟马(1988-),男,安徽宿州人,博士研究生,研究领域是公司财务、公司投资等;徐光华(1963-),男,江苏常州人,教授,博士生导师,博士,研究领域是财务战略与投融资决策、绩效评价与社会责任会计等。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目"企业环境财务指数及其绩效牵引测度研究"(71472088);江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目"基于管理者行为偏差视角的企业财务信息挖掘与非效率投资研究"(CXZZ13_0227)。

Managerial Cognitive Bias, Corporate Government Quality and Over-investment-Evidence Based on Consistency of High Financial Performance

ZHONG Ma, XU Guang-hua

School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Jiangsu, Nanjing 210094, China

Received:2015-10-14 Online:2016-03-15 Published:2016-03-15

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 根据行为和心理科学理论,当面对连续的成功时,人类倾向于将成功进行自我归因而导致过度自信。基于中国上市公司2001-2013年的数据发现,由于自我归因偏差,投资前存在高业绩的过度投资企业具有更高的过度投资水平;进一步,投资前存在至少2年持续高业绩的过度投资样本,过度投资程度更加严重,其中,高业绩持续3年及以上样本的过度投资扭曲程度最为严重。中国现有的公司治理机制,无法彻底消除这种相关性。由此建议,在面对连续的成功时,高管于公司重大决策前需要注意自我归因偏差的影响。

关键词: 过度自信, 持续型财务业绩, 过度投资, 公司投资

Abstract: Based on theory of behavioral and psychological science, people are prone to be overconfident because of self-attribution bias (SAB) when facing a serie of successes. Based on China's listed corporate data during 2001-2013,due to managerial SAB, we find that overinvestment firms overinvest more when high past performance exists; moreover, the overinvestment levels are high in the firms with 2-year-least consistent high performance, especially 3 years consistent ones. At last, our study provides evidence that the present corporate government in China can reduce but not remove this relationship between consistency of high performance and overinvestment. Our suggestion is that top executives should notice SAB in decision-making when facing past consistent successes.

Key words: cognitive bias, overconfidence, consistency of financial performance, overinvestment, corporate investment

中图分类号:

F276.6

钟马, 徐光华. 管理者认知偏差、公司治理质量和过度投资——基于高持续性财务业绩的证据[J]. , 2016(02): 26-36.

ZHONG Ma, XU Guang-hua. Managerial Cognitive Bias, Corporate Government Quality and Over-investment-Evidence Based on Consistency of High Financial Performance[J]. , 2016(02): 26-36.

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