高管薪酬契约有效性与并购中业绩承诺的履行

贵州财经大学学报 ›› 2024 ›› Issue (04): 60-70.

• 工商管理 • 上一篇

高管薪酬契约有效性与并购中业绩承诺的履行

张兴亮, 刘纹邑

南京审计大学会计学院, 江苏南京 211815

收稿日期:2023-07-23 发布日期:2024-08-01
作者简介:张兴亮(1976—),男,江苏邳州人,南京审计大学会计学院教授,硕士生导师,研究方向为公司治理与会计信息披露;刘纹邑(2000—),女,江苏镇江人,南京审计大学会计学院硕士生,研究方向为财务与会计管理。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金项目“基于高管递延薪酬设计视角的国有企业杠杆率治理研究”(19BGL063)。

The Effectiveness of Executive Compensation Contracts and the Fulfillment of Performance Commitments in Mergers and Acquisitions

ZHANG Xingliang, LIU Wenyi

School of Accounting, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing, Jiangsu 211815, China

Received:2023-07-23 Published:2024-08-01

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 企业高管无疑是影响并购中业绩承诺履行的重要因素,目前的相关研究主要集中在高管认知方面,对于与高管利益密切相关的高管薪酬契约在其中的影响却鲜有研究。基于高管薪酬契约有效性的视角,以有并购并处于承诺期的A股上市公司为样本,用高管薪酬业绩敏感性衡量高管薪酬契约的有效性,研究发现,高管薪酬业绩敏感性越高,业绩承诺的完成率和完成的可能性也越高。本文将其中的作用机制归结为高管薪酬契约对业绩承诺履行的正外部性或“溢出效应”,以及业绩承诺补偿条款的“倒逼效应”,并分别从企业产权性质以及业绩承诺补偿方式的视角进行了验证。结论对于进一步完善业绩承诺履行机制有参考价值,同时也拓展了高管薪酬契约外部性的研究文献。

关键词: 高管薪酬契约, 薪酬业绩敏感性, 并购, 业绩承诺

Abstract: Corporate executives are undoubtedly an important factor affecting the fulfillment of performance commitments in mergers and acquisitions. Currently, relevant research mainly focuses on executive cognition, but there is little research on the impact of executive compensation contracts closely related to executive interests. From the perspective of the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts,using A-share listed companies with mergers and acquisitions and in the commitment period as research samples,and measuring the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts based on executive pay-performance sensitivity, this paper finds that the higher the executive pay-performance sensitivity, the higher the completion rate and likelihood of performance commitments. The paper attributes the mechanism to the positive externality or "spillover effect" of executive compensation contracts on performance commitment fulfillment, as well as the "reverse effect" of performance commitment compensation terms, and verifies them from the perspectives of corporate property rights and performance commitment reparation methods. The paper has reference value for further improving the performance commitment fulfillment mechanism, and also expands the research literature on the externalities of executive compensation contracts.

Key words: executive compensation contract, pay-performance sensitivity, merge and acquisitions, performance commitment

中图分类号:

F275.1

张兴亮, 刘纹邑. 高管薪酬契约有效性与并购中业绩承诺的履行[J]. 贵州财经大学学报, 2024(04): 60-70.

ZHANG Xingliang, LIU Wenyi. The Effectiveness of Executive Compensation Contracts and the Fulfillment of Performance Commitments in Mergers and Acquisitions[J]. Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, 2024(04): 60-70.

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高管薪酬契约有效性与并购中业绩承诺的履行

The Effectiveness of Executive Compensation Contracts and the Fulfillment of Performance Commitments in Mergers and Acquisitions

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