贵州财经大学学报

贵州财经大学学报 ›› 2026 ›› Issue (01): 43-53.

• 宏观经济 • 上一篇    

中央银行的利润上缴和亏损覆盖规则对财政货币政策协调的影响机制研究

杨奇松1, 赵全厚1, 杨晨丹妮2   

  1. 1. 中国财政科学研究院, 北京 100142;
    2. 北京大学 新结构经济学研究院, 北京 100871
  • 收稿日期:2025-02-01 发布日期:2026-01-22
  • 作者简介:杨奇松(1990—),男,贵州贵阳人,中国财政科学研究院博士研究生,作者系贵州绿色发展战略高端智库研究员,研究方向为财政理论与政策;赵全厚(1965—)(通信作者),男,山西偏关人,中国财政科学研究院金融研究中心二级研究员,博士生导师,经济学博士,研究方向为财政政策与货币政策协调配合、政府信用的理论与政策、国有金融资本的配置;杨晨丹妮(1989—),女,贵州六盘水人,北京大学新结构经济学研究院博士后,研究方向为制度创新与经济增长。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金一般项目“地方政府隐性债务化解手段效果评估及管理创新研究”(20BGL061);中国财政科学研究院博士研究生与导师联合课题“中央银行的预算管理体制研究”(CBD202411)。

The Impact Mechanism of Central Bank Profit Transfer and Loss Coverage Rules on Fiscal and Monetary Policy Coordination

YANG Qisong1, ZHAO Quanhou1, YANG Chendanni2   

  1. 1. Chinese Academy of Fiscal Sciences, Beijing 100142, China;
    2. Institute of New Structural Economics, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
  • Received:2025-02-01 Published:2026-01-22

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摘要： 既有文献多聚焦于技术层面探讨财政货币政策的协调,但鲜少从预算管理体制的层面研究二者的关系。本文基于央行的利润上缴和亏损覆盖规则,将财政部门和中央银行的目标函数及预算约束引入两部门博弈的DSGE模型,结合IS曲线和新凯恩斯菲利普斯曲线,在合作与非合作的博弈均衡下求解出最优的财政和货币政策函数。本文系统分析了在不同利润上缴和亏损覆盖规则下,面对总需求冲击、成本推动型通货膨胀以及央行损失冲击时,财政货币政策协调的宏观经济效应。研究发现,利润上缴和亏损覆盖规则显著影响财政和央行的政策行为。央行的利润上缴增加了财政部门的赤字政策空间,提高了财政的可持续性;同时财政部门向央行的转移也提高了利率政策的实施空间。当考虑赤字目标和净资本目标时,财政和央行都会偏离最优的政策目标。本文提出的政策建议为进一步理顺财政和央行的体制机制,增强货币政策的独立性和两大政策的协调性,建立现代财税金融体制提供了参考。

关键词: 预算管理体制, 利润上缴和亏损覆盖规则, 财政政策和货币政策协调, 动态随机一般均衡, 合作与非合作博弈

Abstract: Existing studies have primarily focused on the technical dimensions of fiscal and monetary policy interaction, while relatively few have examined the institutional linkage between the two from the perspective of the budget management system. This study incorporates the central bank’s profit transfer and loss coverage rules into a two-sector DSGE model by introducing the objective functions and budget constraints of both the fiscal authority and the central bank. The optimal fiscal and monetary policy functions are derived under cooperative and non-cooperative game equilibria.The findings indicate that profit transfer and loss coverage rules significantly influence the policy behavior of both the fiscal authority and the central bank. Central bank profit transfers expand the fiscal space for deficit policies and enhance fiscal sustainability, while fiscal transfers to the central bank increase the flexibility of interest rate policy implementation. However, when deficit and net capital targets are taken into account, both fiscal and monetary authorities tend to deviate from their optimal policy objectives. The policy recommendations proposed in this study provide a reference for improving the institutional mechanisms between fiscal authorities and the central bank, enhancing the independence of monetary policy, strengthening the coordination between the two policies, and establishing a modern fiscal and financial system.

Key words: budget management system, profit transfer and loss coverage rules, fiscal and monetary policy coordination, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium, cooperative and non-cooperative games

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