关键词: 金融资产配置, 薪酬外部竞争力, 代理成本, 套利动机

Abstract: Promoting the real economy to return to its essence is not only the fundamental measure for preventing and controlling systemic financial risks,it is also a strategic cornerstone for the construction of a modern industrial system.Different from existing studies that focus on the single-dimensional analysis of the impact of human capital on the allocation of corporate financial assets, this study deconstructs the heterogeneous transmission paths of the external competitiveness of employees’ and executives’ compensation. Based on the data of Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2023, a panel fixed-effects model is adopted to reveal the asymmetric influence mechanism on the allocation of corporate financial assets. The examination reveals that the external competitiveness of employees’ compensation significantly exacerbates the allocation of financial assets, while the external competitiveness of executives’ compensation significantly alleviates the allocation of financial assets. There is an inverted "U" shaped relationship between the external competitiveness of corporate compensation and the allocation of financial assets. The mediation effect test shows that the agency cost and the motivation for arbitrage respectively play a mediating role in the process of the external competitiveness of employees’ and executives’ compensation influencing the allocation of financial assets. The heterogeneity test indicates that in enterprises with a small internal compensation gap and executives having a financial background, the promoting effect of the external competitiveness of employees’ compensation on the allocation of financial assets is more significant. However, in enterprises with a large internal compensation gap, executives without a financial background, and low external profit pressure, the alleviating effect of the external competitiveness of executives’ compensation on the allocation of financial assets is more significant. The conclusion of this paper provides a reference for enterprises to implement targeted differential regulation strategies regarding the external competitiveness of employee and executive compensation, and to curb corporate financial asset allocation by improving governance structures and information disclosure.

Key words: financial asset allocation, external competitiveness of Compensation, agency costs, arbitrage motive