金融关联对上市公司盈余管理的影响研究——代理成本的中介作用

›› 2018 ›› Issue (01): 47-56.

金融关联对上市公司盈余管理的影响研究——代理成本的中介作用

孟岩^1,2, 周航¹

1. 哈尔滨商业大学会计学院, 黑龙江哈尔滨 150028;
2. 东北石油大学经济管理学院, 黑龙江大庆 163318

收稿日期:2017-12-10 出版日期:2018-01-15 发布日期:2018-03-06
作者简介:孟岩(1977-),女,黑龙江齐齐哈尔人,哈尔滨商业大学博士研究生,东北石油大学经济管理学院副教授、硕士生导师,研究方向为公司财务、公司治理;周航(1952-),女,黑龙江哈尔滨人,哈尔滨商业大学会计学院教授,博士生导师,研究方向为管理会计、公司财务。
基金资助:
黑龙江省哲学社会科学项目"黑龙江省能源企业公司治理、社会责任共治下的企业价值研究（17GLE288）"；东北石油大学文科基地开放基金"供给侧改革背景下石化产业价值生态系统构建及运行机制研究（WKJD201708）"。

A Study of the Effect of Financial Connections on Earnings Management of Listed Companies-The Mediating Role of Agency Costs

MENG Yan^1,2, ZHOU Hang¹

1. School of Accountancy, Harbin University of Commerce, Harbin, Heilongjiang 150028, China;
2. School of Economics and Management, Northeast Petroleum University, Daqing, Heilongjiang 163318, China

Received:2017-12-10 Online:2018-01-15 Published:2018-03-06

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 以2013-2016年A股上市公司为样本，采用Bootstrap法检验金融关联对盈余管理的影响以及股权、债权和控制权三类代理成本在两者关系中的中介作用。研究发现：金融关联对应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理均存在着显著的负向影响；股权代理成本及债权代理成本在金融关联与应计盈余管理之间起到部分中介作用，控制权代理成本的中介作用不显著；三类代理成本在金融关联与真实盈余管理之间的中介作用不显著。

关键词: 金融关联, 代理成本, 应计盈余管理, 真实盈余管理

Abstract: Taking China's A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2016 as research samples, the paper adopted Bootstrap method to examine the effect of financial connections on earnings management, and the mediating effect of the three kinds of agency costs of equity, debt and control on the relationship of the two sides. The study found:There are significant negative impacts of financial connections on both accruals and real earnings management; between financial connections and accrual-based earnings management the equity and debt agency costs play a partial intermediary role, meanwhile the role of the agency costs of control is nothing special; between financial connections and real earnings management the mediating role of the three kinds agency costs is not obvious.

Key words: financial connection, agency costs, accrual-based earnings management, real earnings management

中图分类号:

F234.4

孟岩, 周航. 金融关联对上市公司盈余管理的影响研究——代理成本的中介作用[J]. , 2018(01): 47-56.

MENG Yan, ZHOU Hang. A Study of the Effect of Financial Connections on Earnings Management of Listed Companies-The Mediating Role of Agency Costs[J]. , 2018(01): 47-56.

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