就业保护法对私营企业经营绩效的影响——基于倍差法的证据

›› 2018 ›› Issue (05): 77-85.

就业保护法对私营企业经营绩效的影响——基于倍差法的证据

姜大伟, 赵忠

中国人民大学劳动人事学院, 北京 100872

收稿日期:2018-03-16 出版日期:2018-09-15 发布日期:2018-09-21
作者简介:姜大伟(1988-),男,河北围场人,中国人民大学劳动人事学院博士研究生,研究方向为劳动经济学;赵忠(1969-),男,云南红河人,中国人民大学劳动人事学院教授,博士生导师,研究方向为劳动经济学、健康经济学、公共政策。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金青年项目"全要素生产率驱动型经济增长条件下的就业创造"（15CRK018）阶段性成果。

The Impacts of Employment Protection Legislation on the Economic Performances of Private Enterprises-Based on the Evidences of Difference in Difference Method

JIANG Da-wei, ZHAO Zhong

School of Labor and Human Resources Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China

Received:2018-03-16 Online:2018-09-15 Published:2018-09-21

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 以中国私营企业为样本，采用倍差法研究2008年《劳动合同法》实施对私营企业经营绩效的影响。通过与微型企业比较，研究发现《劳动合同法》显著提升了中小企业的人均年销售水平；这种影响在非外贸企业和管理水平较低的企业中更显著。同时有证据显示，《劳动合同法》的实施并没有导致私营企业通过增加临时用工来控制劳动成本，相反，该法引起企业用工和解雇水平下降，并可能促使私营企业调整人力资源策略，增加人力资源培训开支，从而提升企业经营绩效。

关键词: 劳动保护法, 私营企业, 经营绩效, 2008年劳动合同法

Abstract: Based on a private enterprise sample in China, we made use of Difference in Difference method to study the impacts of 2008 Labor Contract Law on the private firms' performances. Compared with micro enterprises, we found that the Labor Contact Law significantly promoted the small and medium private enterprises' annual sales per capita; these effects were more significant in non-foreign trade and poor management small and medium firms. At the same time, we found the evidences that the law didn't cause firms to hire more temporary workers to control the labor costs. On the contrary, the decline of the hiring and firing caused by the law might impel private firms to adjust their human capital strategies and invest more in training which would improve the firms' performances.

Key words: employment protection law, private enterprises, economic performance, 2008 Labor Contract Law

中图分类号:

F064
F247

姜大伟, 赵忠. 就业保护法对私营企业经营绩效的影响——基于倍差法的证据[J]. , 2018(05): 77-85.

JIANG Da-wei, ZHAO Zhong. The Impacts of Employment Protection Legislation on the Economic Performances of Private Enterprises-Based on the Evidences of Difference in Difference Method[J]. , 2018(05): 77-85.

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