贵州财经大学学报

贵州财经大学学报 ›› 2024 ›› Issue (05): 48-58.

• 金融经济 • 上一篇    下一篇

连锁股东与费用粘性:市场合谋视角

杨李娟1, 熊凌云1, 王津津2, 廖望3   

  1. 1. 江西财经大学, 江西 南昌 330013;
    2. 南昌市社会保险事业服务中心, 江西 南昌 330038;
    3. 西南财经大学, 四川 成都 200003
  • 收稿日期:2023-10-10 出版日期:2024-09-15 发布日期:2024-09-21
  • 作者简介:杨李娟(1990—),女,云南宾川人,博士,江西财经大学会计学院助理研究员、硕士生导师,研究方向为公司治理与资本市场监管;熊凌云(1988—)(通讯作者),江西南昌人,博士,江西财经大学会计学院副教授、硕士生导师,研究方向公司治理与公司财务;王津津(1999—),女,江西九江人,南昌市社会保险事业服务中心,管理学硕士,研究方向为公司财务与公司治理;廖 望(1998—),女,江西南昌人,西南财经大学会计学院博士研究生,研究方向为资本市场与公司治理。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社科基金青年项目"国资监管提升国企绿色全要素生产率的机制及政策研究"(23CJY034);江西省社会科学基金重点项目"数据资产驱动大中小企业融通创新的机理与模式研究"(24GL03);江西省高校人文社会科学研究青年项目"税收中性视角下增值税留抵退税改革对企业投资效率的影响研究"(JJ23207);江西省高校人文社会科学研究一般项目"国资监管体制改革对国企产能过剩化解的影响、机理与政策研究"(GL23102)。

Cross-Ownership and Expense Stickiness: Based on the Perspective of Market Collusion

YANG Lijuan1, XIONG Lingyun1, WANG Jinjin2, LIAO Wang3   

  1. 1. School of Accountancy, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang, Jiangxi 330013, China;
    2. Nanchang Social Insurance Enterprise Service Center, Nanchang, Jiangxi 330038, China;
    3. School of Accountancy, Southwest University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, Sichuan 200003, China
  • Received:2023-10-10 Online:2024-09-15 Published:2024-09-21

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摘要： 企业间基于连锁股东形成的社会网络关系是影响企业经营管理的重要因素,而学术界主要关注到连锁股东产生的协同效应,对其负面影响关注不足。从市场合谋的视角出发,以2007—2022年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,检验连锁股东对费用粘性的影响。研究发现,连锁股东显著提高了企业的费用粘性,体现为连锁股东的市场合谋效应。从影响机制看,连锁股东主要通过委派董事和减少股权激励提高企业费用粘性。异质性分析表明,行业集中度越高、市场竞争地位越高,连锁股东的负面影响越大;提高股权制衡度、内部控制质量、交易所信息披露考评和分析师关注度能有效缓解连锁股东合谋导致的费用粘性增加。研究结论不仅为上市公司间复杂股权关系形成的经济动因提供了经验证据,还为反垄断相关法规及政策的修订与完善提供了新的参考依据。

关键词: 连锁股东, 费用粘性, 市场合谋, 行业集中度, 市场竞争

Abstract: The social network relationship formed among enterprises based on chain shareholders is an important factor affecting business management, while academics have mainly focused on the synergistic effects generated by chain shareholders and have paid insufficient attention to their negative effects. This paper examines the effect of chain shareholders on expense stickiness from the perspective of market collusion, using China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2022 as the research sample. The research results show that chain shareholders significantly enhance the degree of corporate expense stickiness, which is reflected in the market collusion effect of chain shareholders. In terms of the influence mechanism, the fundamental reason for chain shareholders to enhance corporate expense stickiness lies in market collusion, i.e., the higher the industry concentration, and the higher the competitive market position. In terms of the path of action, chain shareholders mainly influence corporate expense stickiness by appointing directors and reducing equity incentives. In terms of mitigation mechanisms, improving equity checks and balances, internal control quality, exchange information disclosure evaluation and analyst attention can effectively mitigate the increase in stickiness of expenses caused by collusion of chain shareholders. The findings of this paper not only provide empirical evidence for the economic motives of the formation of complex equity relationships among listed companies, but also provide a new reference basis for the revision and improvement of anti-trust related regulations and policies.

Key words: cross-ownership, expense stickiness, market collusion, industry concentration, market competitive

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