政治关联、政府干预与企业用工“双轨制”

›› 2017 ›› Issue (04): 24-34.

政治关联、政府干预与企业用工“双轨制”

于文超

西南政法大学经济学院, 重庆 401120

收稿日期:2017-03-17 出版日期:2017-07-15 发布日期:2017-07-31
作者简介:于文超(1987—),男,山东潍坊人,西南政法大学经济学院副教授,经济学博士、法学在站博士后,主要研究方向为发展经济学、公司金融。
基金资助:
教育部人文社科研究青年项目"地方官员更替对企业避税的影响及其机制研究"（项目编号：16YJC790129）；重庆市博士后科研项目特别资助"公司治理视角下税收征管的经济效应研究"（项目编号：xm2015103）；重庆市教委软科学项目"地方官员更替下的企业避税行为研究"（项目编号：KJ1500107）。

Political Connection,Government Intervention and the“Dual System”of Employment

YU Wen-chao

School of Economics, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing 401120, China

Received:2017-03-17 Online:2017-07-15 Published:2017-07-31

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 减少非正规就业是提升国民就业质量、构建和谐劳动关系的重要基础。利用世界银行2005年中国企业调查数据，着眼于从企业用工"双轨制"的视角考察政治关联对企业雇佣行为的影响。在使用合同工比例刻画企业用工"双轨制"的基础上，研究发现，政治关联有助于减少企业劳动用工"双轨制"，且这一影响在政府管制水平较高的地区更显著。同时，政治关联对企业用工"双轨制"的影响与企业要素密集度和产权性质密切相关。政府关联有助于减少劳动密集型企业、国有企业、民营企业的用工"双轨制"，而对资本密集型企业、外资企业的用工"双轨制"无显著影响。上述发现不仅深化了我们对经济转型背景下企业政治关联产生的经济效应的理解，也为构建和谐劳动关系提供了有益政策借鉴。

关键词: 政治关联, 用工“双轨制”, 合同工比例, 政府干预

Abstract: Reducing the informal employment is an important channel of improving the employment quality and building harmonious labor relationship. Using the World Bank's Chinese firms' survey data in 2005 as sample, this paper studies the effect of political connection on the "dual system" of employment. On the basic of measuring the "dual system" of employment using the temporary workers' proportion, the results indicate that political connection can reduce the "dual system" of employment, and the effect is more significant in the regions with more government regulation.Additionally, the impact of political connection on the "dual system" of employment is closely related to firms' factor intensity and property right. Political connection is helpful to reduce the "dual system" of the labor-intensive firms, state-owned firms and private firms, while political connection has no effect on capital-intensive firms and foreign firms. These findings not only deepen our understanding of the hand of government intervention under economic transition background, but also provide useful policy suggestions of building harmonious labor relationship.

Key words: political connection, the “dual system&rdquo, of employment, permanent workers' proportion, government intervention

中图分类号:

F062.9

于文超. 政治关联、政府干预与企业用工“双轨制”[J]. , 2017(04): 24-34.

YU Wen-chao. Political Connection,Government Intervention and the“Dual System”of Employment[J]. , 2017(04): 24-34.

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