关键词: 制度环境, 政治关联, 民营企业, 债务契约履行, 会计稳健性

Abstract: This paper studies whether the political connections of private enterprises affect the extent of the supervision of the banks on the debt contract' fulfillment. The paper uses the demand for accounting conservatism of banks as the measure of banks' supervision over debt contracts' fulfillment, and finds that in area of serious government intervention, private enterprises connect with government to form "bottom-up" connections, so banks strictly supervise debt contracts' fulfillment. While in area of low government intervention, private enterprises connect with government to form "top-down" connections, so banks will not strictly supervise debt contracts' fulfillment. The additional test in the paper finds that the above results significantly exist in local political connection enterprises. The paper not only has implications for comprehensive understanding the causes and consequences of political connection, but also extends the research of political connections from the influence on the signing of contracts to the influence on the fulfillment of contracts.

Key words: political connections, private enterprises, debt contracts' fulfillment, accounting conservatism