民营企业政治关联与债务契约履行

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 民营企业政治关联如何影响银行对其债务契约履行的监督程度，是一个有待探索的新话题。以银行对借款企业会计稳健性的需求衡量银行对债务契约履行的监督，研究发现，在政府干预越严重的地区，民营企业与政府越可能形成"自下而上"的政治关联，银行对其债务契约的履行监督越严格；而在政府干预较少的地区，民营企业与政府更可能形成"自上而下"的政治关联，银行减少了对债务契约的履行监督。进一步研究发现，上述结果显著存在于地方政治关联企业中，而且在排除其他可能的解释后上述结果依然成立。研究结果不仅对于全面认识政治关联的成因及后果具有启示意义，也将政治关联对契约缔结影响的研究拓展到了对契约履行影响的研究。

关键词: 制度环境, 政治关联, 民营企业, 债务契约履行, 会计稳健性

Abstract: This paper studies whether the political connections of private enterprises affect the extent of the supervision of the banks on the debt contract' fulfillment. The paper uses the demand for accounting conservatism of banks as the measure of banks' supervision over debt contracts' fulfillment, and finds that in area of serious government intervention, private enterprises connect with government to form "bottom-up" connections, so banks strictly supervise debt contracts' fulfillment. While in area of low government intervention, private enterprises connect with government to form "top-down" connections, so banks will not strictly supervise debt contracts' fulfillment. The additional test in the paper finds that the above results significantly exist in local political connection enterprises. The paper not only has implications for comprehensive understanding the causes and consequences of political connection, but also extends the research of political connections from the influence on the signing of contracts to the influence on the fulfillment of contracts.

Key words: political connections, private enterprises, debt contracts' fulfillment, accounting conservatism

中图分类号:

F820

张兴亮, 严明. 民营企业政治关联与债务契约履行[J]. , 2018(01): 25-38.

ZHANG Xing-liang, YAN Ming. Private Enterprises' Political Connections and Debt Contracts' Fulfillment[J]. , 2018(01): 25-38.

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