多种情境因素下国有企业前期业绩与CEO非正常变更间关系研究

›› 2018 ›› Issue (03): 64-71.

多种情境因素下国有企业前期业绩与CEO非正常变更间关系研究

吴明霞^1,2, 谢永珍¹

1. 山东大学管理学院, 山东济南 250010;
2. 山东财经大学国际经贸学院, 山东济南 250014

收稿日期:2018-01-05 出版日期:2018-05-15 发布日期:2018-05-22
作者简介:吴明霞(1980-),女,山东莱州人,山东大学管理学博士,山东财经大学讲师,研究方向为公司治理;谢永珍(1963-),女,山东威海人,山东大学教授,博士生导师,研究方向为公司治理。
基金资助:
本文得到国家自然科学基金"治理风险导向的商业银行公司治理研究：理论发展与机制耦合"（71272119）、董事会非正式沟通对决策质量的影响研究：路径、机理与效应（71372093）、教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目"基于SCP的董事会治理绩效形成机理与影响因素研究"（13YJA630109）和山东省自然科学基金"山东省上市公司董事会治理绩效评价与影响因素研究"（ZR2013GM020）的资助。

The Research of the Relationship between SOE's Past Performance and CEO Forced Turnover under Multiple Situational Factors

WU Ming-xia^1,2, XIE Yong-zhen¹

1. School of Management, Shandong University, Shandong Province, Jinan, Shandong 250010, China;
2. Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Shandong Province, Jinan, Shandong 250014, China

Received:2018-01-05 Online:2018-05-15 Published:2018-05-22

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 通过对2007—2016年中国所有国有企业CEO非正常变更样本的Logistics回归分析，研究了多重情境下公司前期业绩与CEO非正常变更间的关系以证明国有企业目标的多重性。研究结果显示：在亏损国企样本组，公司前期业绩与CEO非正常变更间存在显著负相关关系，而这种负相关关系在盈利样本组则不显著。以上结果说明：不同分类的国有企业股东目标实现的顺序是不同的，中国国有上市公司的目标多元化能够影响公司前期业绩与CEO非正常变更间的关系。

关键词: 公司前期业绩, CEO非正常变更, 国有企业目标多元化, 公司治理效率

Abstract: Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's State-owned listed firms from 2007 to 2016, we estimate the relationship between past performance and CEO forced turnover in order to prove that China's State-owned listed firms have multiple goals. There is a significant negative relationship between past performance and CEO forced turnover in loss-making firms but no such relationship in profit-making firms. These results indicate State-owned enterprises' multiple goals have effects on the relationship between past performance and CEO forced turnover.

Key words: past performance, CEO forced turnover, state-owned enterprises' multiple goals, corporate governance efficiency

中图分类号:

F270

吴明霞, 谢永珍. 多种情境因素下国有企业前期业绩与CEO非正常变更间关系研究[J]. , 2018(03): 64-71.

WU Ming-xia, XIE Yong-zhen. The Research of the Relationship between SOE's Past Performance and CEO Forced Turnover under Multiple Situational Factors[J]. , 2018(03): 64-71.

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