Local Fiscal Decentralization, Selective Transfer of Rural Labor Force and Investment in Rural Elementary Education

Abstract

Abstract: Under the existing education system the county (municipal) government takes primary responsibility for development of rural elementary education, sub-provincial fiscal decentralization have major impact on local investment in rural elementary education; and interregional selective transfer of rural labor force have made local investment in rural elementary education with strong externalities. Using panel data of 108 counties (municipals) from 2007 to 2013 in Henan Province, this paper empirical test the impact of local fiscal decentralization and selective transfer of rural labor force on rural elementary spending of counties(municipals) government. The study shows that sub-provincial fiscal decentralization significantly reduces local government spending in rural elementary education; at the same time, the larger scale of rural labor force transfer out the lower spending in elementary education of local government.

Key words: local fiscal decentralization, selective transfer of rural labor force, rural elementary education

CLC Number:

F304.4

DENG Meng-zhi. Local Fiscal Decentralization, Selective Transfer of Rural Labor Force and Investment in Rural Elementary Education[J]. , 2017(03): 93-100.

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