Abstract: Aiming at the implementation of China's innovation encouragement policy and intellectual property protection policy, this paper explores the evolution process of open and appropriability mixed innovation strategy and government decision-making in the process of enterprise innovation from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. An evolutionary game model of the government's open innovation incentive policy, intellectual property encouragement policy and the open and appropriability mixed innovation strategy of the enterprise were established. According to the replication dynamic equation, the participants' behavior evolution law and behavior evolution stability strategy were obtained, and the influencing factors of the enterprise's open and appropriability mixed innovation strategy were analyzed. The results show that the open evaluation coefficient, exclusive conversion coefficient, open subsidy coefficient, intellectual property subsidy coefficient and the initial proportion of adopting open and appropriability strategies in the system will have an impact on the open and exclusive mixed innovation strategy of enterprises.

Key words: open innovation, openness, appropriability, evolutionary game, evolutionary stable strategy