Mixed reform of state-owned enterprises, government subsidies and innovation

Abstract

Abstract: Based on the unbalanced panel data of the state-owned enterprise mixed reform in China's Shenzhen-Shanghai A-share market from 2003 to 2017, this paper uses fixed effects regression to analyze the influence of government subsidies and state-owned enterprise innovation, and the influence of state-owned enterprise mixed reform on the innovation effect of government subsidies. The results show that government subsidies can promote the innovation of state-owned enterprises; the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises significantly enhances the innovation effect of government subsidies. Further analysis found that the higher the quality of government, the better the innovation effect of government subsidies, and the stronger the effect of mixed reform of state-owned enterprises on the innovation effect of government subsidies. Finally, this article examines the policy trend of "highlighting the main business" in the "Operational Guidelines for the Reform of Mixed Ownership of Central Enterprises". The results show that government subsidies have significantly increased the R&D investment in the main business of enterprises, and the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises can not only promote the R&D investment in the main business subsidized by the government, but also curb its non-main business R&D investment.

Key words: mixed reform of state-owned enterprises, government subsidies, innovation, government quality

CLC Number:

F812.4

YANG Xing-quan, HAN He-yang. Mixed reform of state-owned enterprises, government subsidies and innovation[J]. Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, 2021(02): 1-10.

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