Common Ownership and Opportunistic Shareholding Selling Behaviors of Executives

Abstract

Abstract: Along with the shareholding reform and the successive introduction of various trading systems, insider trading has gradually become important in the capital market and is under the "spotlight" of financial supervision. How to regulate the trading behavior of insiders and effectively maintain the fair competition order in the capital market has become one of the issues that must be dealt with as the capital market reform moves into deeper water. This paper uses A-share listed companies from 2007-2019 as a sample to examine whether chain shareholders have an impact on the amount and frequency of insider trading. It is found that:chain shareholders can inhibit opportunistic shareholding reduction by executives; chain shareholders play a monitoring role on executives' self-interest by dispatching directors to listed companies more actively; heterogeneity analysis shows that the negative effect of chain shareholders on opportunistic shareholding reduction by executives is more significant in listed companies with lower marketization level, higher fracture zones within the executive team and unbalanced salary structure. This study provides direct evidence of the governance effects of chain shareholders and is informative on how to further constrain shareholder-executive agency conflicts.

Key words: common ownership, stock selling, opportunistic behaviors, insider trading

CLC Number:

F271

HUANG Shunwu, PAN Lulu. Common Ownership and Opportunistic Shareholding Selling Behaviors of Executives[J]. Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, 2023(03): 50-59.

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