控制权私有收益对企业双元创新平衡影响研究:公司治理的调节作用

›› 2018 ›› Issue (02): 78-85.

控制权私有收益对企业双元创新平衡影响研究:公司治理的调节作用

顾群, 李敏, 郑杨

天津财经大学商学院, 天津 300222

收稿日期:2017-11-20 出版日期:2018-03-15 发布日期:2018-03-26
作者简介:顾群(1978-),男,上海人,管理学博士,中国财政科学研究院博士后,天津财经大学商学院会计学系副教授,研究方向为公司治理与企业创新;李敏(1995-),女,山西临汾人,2016级硕士研究生,研究方向为财务管理;郑杨(1992-),男,河北唐山人,2016级硕士研究生,研究方向为财务管理。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金项目"控制权私有收益与企业创新模式研究"（15BJY010）。

The Effect of Private Benefits of Control on the Balance of Ambidextrous Innovation: the Adjustment of the behavior Corporate Governance

GU Qun, LI Min, ZHENG Yang

Business School, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China

Received:2017-11-20 Online:2018-03-15 Published:2018-03-26

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 作为公司治理研究主题之一的控制权私有收益对企业的双元创新平衡有着重要影响。利用深圳证券交易所2008—2014年民营上市高新技术企业的数据，探讨了控制权私有收益对企业双元创新平衡的影响以及公司治理的调节作用。研究结果显示：控制权私有收益越大，企业的双元创新平衡越差；公司治理将弱化控制权私有收益与双元创新平衡之间的负向作用。

关键词: 公司治理, 控制权私有收益, 双元创新平衡

Abstract: As one of the subjects of corporate governance, The private benefits of control have important influence on the balance of ambidextrous innovation. Taking private listed high-tech enterprises in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2014 as samples, this paper analyzes the impact of private benefits of control on the balance of ambidextrous innovation. The corporate governance plays a significant moderating role. This study finds out that private benefits of control has a negative significant effect on balance of ambidextrous innovation. female executives participation has a stronger impact on R&D investment. Corporate governance will weaken the negative effect of private benefits of control and the balance of ambidextrous innovation.

Key words: corporate governance, private benefits of control, balance of ambidextrous innovation

中图分类号:

F276.44

顾群, 李敏, 郑杨. 控制权私有收益对企业双元创新平衡影响研究:公司治理的调节作用[J]. , 2018(02): 78-85.

GU Qun, LI Min, ZHENG Yang. The Effect of Private Benefits of Control on the Balance of Ambidextrous Innovation: the Adjustment of the behavior Corporate Governance[J]. , 2018(02): 78-85.

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