上市公司高管薪酬契约的双重参照效应研究——基于系族集团的视角

›› 2018 ›› Issue (03): 72-84.

上市公司高管薪酬契约的双重参照效应研究——基于系族集团的视角

孙园园^1,2, 马忠¹

1. 北京交通大学, 北京 100044;
2. 山东建筑大学, 山东济南 250101

收稿日期:2018-01-18 出版日期:2018-05-15 发布日期:2018-05-22
作者简介:孙园园(1981-),女,山东济南人,北京交通大学博士研究生,山东建筑大学商学院讲师,研究方向为公司治理与高管薪酬;马忠(1959-),男,北京人,北京交通大学教授、博士生导师,研究方向为公司治理与财务。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金项目"金字塔型控股集团的多层级公司治理与内部资本市场研究"（14BGL039）；山东省高等学校科学技术计划项目（J17RB106）。

A Study on the Double Benchmark Effect of Executive Compensation Contract of Affiliated Group Enterprise

SUN Yuan-yuan^1,2, MA Zhong¹

1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China;
2. Business School, Shandong Jianzhu University, Jinan, Shandong 250101, China

Received:2018-01-18 Online:2018-05-15 Published:2018-05-22

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 利用2008—2015年度系族上市公司数据，研究其高管薪酬契约制定过程中的双重参照效应。研究表明，系族上市公司高管薪酬契约的制定既受到系族外部同行业高管薪酬参照基准的显著影响，同时还受到系族内部其他上市公司高管薪酬参照基准的影响，并且随着系族内上市公司数量的增加，系族内部薪酬参照效应占优。进一步研究发现，内外部参照基准的使用存在权衡行为，系族上市公司倾向于加大两者之中较高者的参照作用。这说明心理因素是董事会制定高管薪酬时需考虑的重要因素，系族上市公司通过内外部双重参照基准的使用满足高管的公平偏好，有助于深入理解和完善系族上市公司高管薪酬的决定机制。

关键词: 上市公司, 高管薪酬, 系族集团, 社会比较, 参照效应

Abstract: Based on the 2008-2015 annual data, this paper empirically examined the double benchmark effect in the executive compensation contract of affiliated group enterprise in our country. Research indicated that, in the process of executive compensation, the executive compensation of affiliated group enterprise is affected not only by the influence of the executive compensation of the external peers, but also by the benchmark of the other listed companies within the affiliated enterprise group. As the number of companies in affiliated enterprise group increases, the internal benchmark effect is even more pronounced. Further research found that, there is tradeoff behavior in the selection of external and internal benchmark. The listed company will increase the weight of the higher of the two benchmarks. This shows that the board pay attention to the social psychology of executives when making executive compensation contracts and satisfy the executive's fair preference through the use of internal and external benchmarks,and helps us to understand and improvement the decision mechanism of executive compensation for affiliated group enterprises.

Key words: affiliated enterprise group, executive compensation, social comparison, benchmark effect

中图分类号:

F244

孙园园, 马忠. 上市公司高管薪酬契约的双重参照效应研究——基于系族集团的视角[J]. , 2018(03): 72-84.

SUN Yuan-yuan, MA Zhong. A Study on the Double Benchmark Effect of Executive Compensation Contract of Affiliated Group Enterprise[J]. , 2018(03): 72-84.

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