贵州财经大学学报

贵州财经大学学报 ›› 2024 ›› Issue (03): 40-50.

• 工商管理 • 上一篇    

非家族股东超额委派董事与企业会计信息质量——来自上市家族企业的经验证据

熊磊1,2, 李先洪1, 苏春1,2   

  1. 1. 重庆理工大学 会计学院, 重庆 400054;
    2. 重庆银行 博士后科研工作站, 重庆 400024
  • 收稿日期:2023-11-20 发布日期:2024-05-23
  • 通讯作者: 苏春(1985—),男,四川渠县人,重庆理工大学会计学院副教授,主要研究方向为公司财务与公司治理。
  • 作者简介:熊磊(1987—),男,湖南娄底人,重庆理工大学会计学院副教授,主要研究方向为公司治理;李先洪(1999—),男,湖北黄冈人,重庆理工大学会计学院硕士研究生,主要研究方向为财务与会计
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目“新型农业经营主体与小农户协同发展机理及对策研究”(20CJY040);重庆市博士后研究项目特别资助“家族企业超额家族董事席位的形成机制研究”(2022CQBSHTBT001)。

Non-family shareholders’ over-appointment of directors and corporate accounting information quality -Empirical Evidence from Listed Family Firms

XIONG Lei1,2, LI Xianhong1, SU Chun1,2   

  1. 1. School of Accounting, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, China;
    2. Postdoctoral Research Station, Bank of Chongqing, Chongqing 400024, China
  • Received:2023-11-20 Published:2024-05-23

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摘要： 如何认识股东超额委派董事这一行为,切实规范董事会决策机制,已成为公司治理领域亟待解决的问题。现有研究主要探讨了控股股东超额委派董事对企业经济决策行为的影响,鲜有文献从非控股股东超额委派董事的视角展开讨论。鉴于此,本文以2008—2021年我国上市家族企业为研究对象,深入考察非家族股东超额委派董事与企业会计信息质量之间的关系。研究发现,非家族股东超额委派董事会降低企业会计信息质量。机制分析表明,非家族股东超额委派董事会加剧第一类代理冲突,进而导致企业会计信息质量下降。进一步研究发现,当内部控制质量较低、企业处于非数字化转型期、外部审计监督较弱、地区市场化进程较慢时,非家族股东超额委派董事对企业会计信息质量的负向影响更显著。经济后果分析表明,非家族股东超额委派董事降低了会计信息质量,由此增加了企业股价崩盘风险,即会计信息质量在两者之间具有部分中介作用。

关键词: 家族企业, 非家族股东, 超额委派董事, 代理冲突, 会计信息质量

Abstract: How to recognize the behavior of shareholders’ over-appointment of directors and effectively regulate the decision-making mechanism of the board of directors has become an urgent issue in the field of corporate governance. Existing studies have mainly explored the impact of controlling shareholders’ over-appointment of directors on the economic decision-making behavior of enterprises, and there is little literature discussing the perspective of non-controlling shareholders’ over-appointment of directors.In view of this, this paper takes listed family firms in China from 2008 to 2021 as the research object and examines in depth the relationship between over-appointment of directors by non-family shareholders and the quality of corporate accounting information. It is found that over-appointment of boards by non-family shareholders reduces corporate accounting information quality. Mechanism analysis shows that non-family shareholders’ over-appointment of boards of directors exacerbates Type I agency conflicts, which in turn leads to a decrease in the quality of corporate accounting information. Further research finds that the negative effect of over-appointment of directors by non-family shareholders on the quality of corporate accounting information is more significant when the quality of internal control is lower, the firm is in a non-digital transition period, external audit supervision is weaker, and the regional marketization process is slower. The analysis of economic consequences suggests that the over-appointment of directors by non-family shareholders decreases the quality of accounting information, thereby increasing the risk of a firm’s stock price collapse. In other words, the quality of accounting information partially mediates between these two factors.

Key words: family firms, non-family shareholders, over-appointed directors, agent conflict, quality of accounting information

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