Local Government Competition and Environmental Governance—the Regulation of Environmental Decentralization

Abstract

Abstract: Opinions are divided in existing researches as to whether local government should carry out "race to the top" or "race to the bottom" strategic interactions in environmental governance. The article, based on environmental decentralization, starts by explaining the impact mechanism of local government competition on environmental governance. Then, empirical study is conducted on the impact of local government competition on environmental governance. Three conclusions are drawn in the study. Firstly, competition between local governments has a significant negative impact on environmental governance, which means environmental governance of local government has the characteristics of "race to the bottom". Secondly, research on the interaction of environmental decentralization and local government competition shows that, environmental decentralization has a positive regulation on the environmental governance, which enhances the strategy of "race to the top". Thirdly, the robustness tests of local government competition and environmental decentralization reveal that reform of environmental decentralization is the key to green development in China, which further verifies the conclusion of the article.

Key words: environmental governance, local government competition, environmental decentralization

CLC Number:

X321

LI Qiang, LI Xin-hua. Local Government Competition and Environmental Governance—the Regulation of Environmental Decentralization[J]. Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, 2020(03): 101-110.

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