Does Corporate Executive's Positions in the Industry Associations Can Reduce the Cost of Debt—Evidence from Listed Companies in China

Abstract

Abstract: Financing costs have a huge impact on the business development of enterprises. Reducing corporate financing costs is a key area of "cost reduction" in China's supply-side structural reforms. Based on the resource dependence theory, reputation theory, and information asymmetry theory, this article uses the panel data of 2290 listed companies in China from 2008 to 2017 to study the relationship between the corporate executives’ positions in the industry association and the cost of debt financing. The empirical study found that: The corporate executives’ positions in the industry associations can significantly reduce the cost of debt financing of enterprises; The corporate executives’ positions in the industry associations help enterprises reduce the cost of debt financing through the role of resource extraction, reputation guarantee and information transmission. The research conclusion of this article provides microscopic evidence for the important role of social intermediary organizations such as industry associations in economic and social life, and has important reference significance for vigorously cultivating the development of social intermediary organizations such as industry associations in China.

Key words: senior executives, industry association, cost of debt

CLC Number:

F276.1

QI Zi-peng, ZHOU Yun-chen. Does Corporate Executive's Positions in the Industry Associations Can Reduce the Cost of Debt—Evidence from Listed Companies in China[J]. Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, 2021(03): 74-82.

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