Abstract: How to effectively manage the stickiness of executive compensation has been widely discussed in theoretical and practical circles. This paper takes A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as research samples to empirically test whether the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders has an impact on executive compensation stickiness. The empirical study finds that the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders can effectively inhibit the stickiness of executive compensation. When the ownership concentration is higher, the industry competition degree is lower and analysts pay more attention to the enterprise, the inhibition effect of the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders is more significant. Further research finds that information transparency has a partial mediating effect on the influence of exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders on executive compensation stickiness, that is, the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders encourages enterprises to improve corporate information transparency to restrain controlling shareholders' hollowing out and self-interest behavior of senior management, thus reducing executive compensation stickiness. Finally, the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders can effectively reduce the executive-employee pay stickiness gap and promote the fairness of executive-employee pay distribution rules.

Key words: compensation stickiness, exit threat, principal-agent problem, information transparency