Abstract: Effectively curbing executives’ opportunistic stock selling is a core issue in improving investor protection mechanisms and strengthening the micro-foundations for high-quality capital market development. Whether and how ESG rating divergence, a key dimension of non-financial information, affects executive stock selling decisions remains an urgent question to be examined. Taking A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2023 as the research sample, this study systematically investigates the relationship between ESG rating divergence and executives’ opportunistic stock selling. The results indicate that ESG rating divergence significantly exacerbates executives’ opportunistic stock selling, with this effect being particularly pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and heavily polluting industries. The mechanism examination reveals that ESG rating divergence intensifies executives’ opportunistic stock selling primarily by increasing corporate market risk and reducing information transparency. Furthermore, governance countermeasures suggest that improving the quality of corporate ESG disclosure, enhancing internal control quality, strengthening oversight by securities analysts, and reinforcing regional legal frameworks all help mitigate the executives’ opportunistic stock selling driven by ESG rating divergence. The findings expand the literature on the economic consequences of ESG rating divergence and provide feasible pathways for comprehensively understanding the trigger mechanisms of executives’ opportunistic stock selling and effectively restraining such behavior.

Key words: ESG rating divergence, opportunistic stock selling, market risk, information transparency